




This paper defines "media" in markets. Under some conditions, a.
competitive allocation is a medium, and a medium is in the core, but
the converses are not always true, i.e., a medium is not always a com-
petitive allocation, and an allocation that is in the core is not always
a medium.
A medium, as explained in section 6, is the game theoretic solution
asserting that the contribution to a market by any coalition can not
increase all traders' preferences at the same time.
First we will mention the above monotonical relations among cores,
media, and equilibria for markets with finite traders (in section 3, 4),
and next for markets with a continuum of traders, we will prove the
equivalence relations among cores, media, and equilibria by way of
using media (in section 5).
The auther learned many things in this paper from B. Shitovitz [1].
2. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
We will be working in a Euclidean space R"; the dimension n of
the space represents the number of different commodities being traded
in the market. Superscripts will be used exclusively to denotes coor-
dinates. Following standard practice, for x and y in R" we write x>y
to mean x!>y!'for all i; we use x^y to mean x'^y' for all i; and
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we use x:2::y to mean x~y but not x=y. The integral of a vector 
function is to be taken as the vector of integrals of the components. 
The scalar product L~=l Xiyi of two members x and y in RII is denoted 
x . y. The symbol 0 denotes the origin in RII as well as the real num-
ber zero; no confusion will result. The symbol \ will be used for 
set-theoretic subtraction, whereas-will be reserved for ordinary alge-
braic subtraction. The i th unit vector ej is the vector in R II whose i 
th coordinate is 1 and whose other coordinates vanish. We use e= 
L~=lei to denote the vector in RII all of whose coordinates are l. 
In the following, we use measure-theoretic notations even for mar-
kets with finte traders, but no matter will result. 
Let (T,58, f.J.) be a measure space of economic agents, i.e., T denotes 
a set (the traders), 58 denotes a a·field of subset of T (the family of 
coalitions), and f.J. denotes a totally finite complete positive a-additive 
measure on 58. An atom of the measure space(T,~, f.J.) is a coalition 
S with f.J.(S»O such that for each coalition R~S we have eitherf.J. (R) 
=0 or f.J.(S""-R) =0. 
A commodity bundle x is a point in the negative orthant Q of RII. 
An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an integrable 
function x from T to Q. All integrales are with respect to the vari-
able t (which stands for trader), and in most cases the range of in-
tegration is all of T. In an integral we will therefore omit the symbol 
df.J.(t) and the indication of dependence of the integrand on t, and will 
specifically indicate the range of integration only when it differs from 
all of T. Thus f x means fTx(t)df.J.(t). A null sets of traders is a 
set of measure O. Null sets of trader are systematically ignored through-
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out this paper. Thus a statement asserts for "all" traders, or "each" 
trader, or "each" trader in a certain set, is to be understood to hold 
for all such traders except possibly for a null set of traders. 
There is a fixed initial assignment i. We assume 
(2. 1) Ji>O. 
This asserts that no commodity is totally absent from the market. 
An allocation (or "final assignment" or. "trade") is an assignment x 
for which J x = J i. For an initial assignment i, and an allocation x, 
we assume 
(2. 2) i(t) ~ 0, and x(t) ~ ° for each t E T. 
The meaning of this assertion will be explained later on in Remark 
(2. 1). 
For each trader t a relation >t is defined on Q, which is called the 
preference relation of trader t and satisfies the following conditions: 
(2. 3) desirability (of the commodities): x ~ y implies x.> tY. 
(2. 4) Continuity (in the commodities): For each y E Q, the sets{ x: 
x>tY} and {x:y>tx} are open relative to Q. 
(2. 5) Measurability: If x and yare assignments, then the set{ t:x(t) 
>tY} is measurable in T. 
An assignment y dominates an allocation x via a coalition S (S 
is then said to block x) if y(t) > tx(t) for each t E S, and S is effective 
for y, i. e., is y = 1 i. The core is the set of all allocations that are 
not blocked by any non-null coalition. An allocation is Pareto opti-
mal if it is not blocked by T. 
A price vecter p is an n-tuple of non-negative real numbers, not all 
of which vanish. A competitive equilibrium is a pair (p, .x) consisting 
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of a price vector p and an allocation x, such that for all traders t, 
x(t) is maximal with respect to >t in t's budget set Bp(t)={x: p·x~ 
p.i(~)} A competitive allocation x is an allocation for which there 
exists a price vector p such that (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium. 
Remark(2. 1): The meaning of (2. 2) is as follows: 
(1) Let 
S={t: i(t)=O, x(t)=O, tET}. 
Then each trader t (t E S) does not trade. So, without effect on the 
essence of a problem, we may assume that .£l(S) = 0. 
(2) Let 
S={t: i(t)~O, x(t)=O, tET}. 
If .£l(S) *" 0, i dominates x via coalition S. Therefore x is not in the 
core. Such a case is no object of this paper. So we may assume that 
.£l(S) = 0. 
(3) Let 
S={t: i(t)=O, X(t)20, tET}. 
By (2. 1), .£l(S) *" 1. Suppose that .£l(S) > 0. Let 
y(t) = x(t) + .£l(~S) Is x for t E 1\S. 
Then, by desirability, y dominates x via the coalition T\S. Therefore 
x is blocked by T\S. So x is not in the core. Therefore we may as-
sume that .£l(S) = 0. 
(4) Shitovitz does not use (2. 2) in [1], but, in discussions, he uses "in-
dividua1.rationality" in order that .£l(S)=O where S={t: x(t)=O, O>tO, 
t E T}. Even. in the discussions of this paper, if we assume that .£l(S)=O, 
we can carry out the discussions with minor changing the descriptions 
of theorems, lemmae, and proof. 
In the following let F, G, H, ... denote functions defined on T whose 
values are subsets of R n, while f, g, h,... denote functions defined on 
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T whose values are points in Rn. 
For any set-valued function F define: 
IF= {f: f is integrable and f(t) E F(t) for all t}, 
and 
Define 
G(t) = {x - x(t): x >tx(t)}, 
and 
G*= f G. 
If, for any coalition S, Is (i - x) EE G*, x is a medium. 
3. MARKETS WITH FINETE TRADERS 
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For markets with finite traders, we will indicate trader with an in-
teger t where t = 1, 2, ... , m, and T = {I, 2, ... , m} is the set of all traders, 
and assume that ,u(t) = 1 for each t E T. 
In this section, we will prove that if an allocation is competitive, it 
is a medium, and that if an allocation is a medium, it is in the core. 
Also, in section 4, we will show that, by counter examples, the inverse 
relations are not always true, i. e., there exists a medium which is not 
competitive and there exists an allocation which is in the core, but 
which is no medium. 
THEOREM(3. 1): If an allocation is competitive, it is a medium. 
PROOF: Assume that an allocation x is competitive. Then there ex-
ists a price vector p such that p - x(t) ~ p. i(t), and p. G(t) > 0 for all 
traders t. However, since J p. x = p . J x = p -f i = J p - i, p. x(t) = p-
i(t) for any t E T. Therefore, for any coalition S, p ·Is(i -x) = o. 
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Also p. G* = p . f G = f p. G > O. Hence G* :J;l Is (i - x). 
LEMMA(3. 1): Let x be an allocation, and S be a non-null coalition. 
Then x is blocked by S if and only if Is (i - x) E Is G. 
PROOF: First we prove the "if" part. Suppose that Is (i -x) E Is G. 
Then there exists an assignment f such that 1f = 1 (i - x), and f(t) E 
G(t) for t E S. Therefore [f(t) + x(t)] > t x(t) for t E S, and 1 (f + x) 
= 1i. Hence, the coalition S blocks x. 
Conversely we prove the "only if" part. Suppose that x is blocked 
by the coalition S. Then there exists an assignment g such that 
g(t) > tx(t) for t E S, and 
Then [g(t)-X(t)]EG(t) for tES. Therefore IsG 3 J:(g-x)= Is(i-x). 
Q. E. D. 
LEMMA(3. 2): Let x be a Pareto optimal allocation. Let SI and S2 
be coalitions such that SI ~ S2, and f.J. (SI) > O. Then r G ~ r G. 
)51 )52 
PROOF: If SI = S2, r G = r G. Hence the lemma holds. So, we 
)51 )52 
assume that S2\SI * ¢. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a 
trader toE SI such the [G(to)+x(to)] 3 O. Let 
{ 
0 for to, 
f(t) = x(to) 
f.J.(T\{to}} +x(t) for t E T\{t
o}. 
Then, by desrability and (2.2), f(t»tx(t) for all tET, and ff= fx= 
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f i. Therefore x is blocked by T. So x is not Pareto optimal. This 
is a contradiction. Hence [G(t) + x(t)] :t3 0 for all t E T. 
Let z be any point such that Z E (G. We will prove that Z E (G. 
J~. J~ 
For the point z, there exists an assignment g such that z = fslg, and 
g(t) E G(t)for t E Sl. Let to be any fixed trader such that to E Sl' 
Then g(to) + x(toP:~ 0, because [G(to) + x(to)] :t3 O. Therefore, by conti-
nuity, (i. e., [G(to) + x(to)] is open relative to Q), there exists an integer 




g(t)+x(t)- C·elo for t=to, 
h(t) = g(t) + x(t) for t E Sl\{ to}, 
,u(S~Sl) ·el o + x(t) for t E SASl. 
Then, by desirability, h(t) E [G(t) + x(t)] for t E S2 and (h = z + ( x. JS2 JS2 
Therefore Z = ((h - x) E (G. Q. E. D. 
J~ JS2 
THEOREM(3. 2): If an allocation is a medium, it is in the core. 
PROOF: Let x be a medium· Then f(i - x) E G*. Therefore, by 
Lemma(3. 1), x is not blocked by T. Hence x is Pareto optimal. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that x is not in the core. Then there is 
a coalition S such that ,u(S) > 0, and S blocks x. Then, by Lemma 
(3. 1), fs(i-x) E fsG. By Lemma(3. 2), fsG~G*. Hence !s(i-x) E G*. 
So x is no medium. This is a contradiction. 
Q. E. D. 
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4. COUNTER EXAMPLES 
In this section, we will show that the inverse relation of Theorem 
(3. 1) and Theorem(3. 2) do not always hold. 
The following example is a counter example of the assertion that 
a medium is competitive. 
Example(4. 1): Let 
x(u) = (2, 2, 2) for u = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
Let 
i(1)=(I, 1+ £, -1- £)+(,2,2,2), 
i(2)=(-I, -1- £,1+ £ )+(2,2,2) 
i(3)=(I, -1- £, 1+ £ )+(2,2,2), 
i(4)=(-I, 1+ £, -1- £)+(2,2,2), 
i(5)=(1+ £, -1- £,1)+(2,2,2), and 
i(6)=(-I- £,1+ £ ,-1)+(2,2,2) 
where, for example, £ = 0.1. Let 
(4. 1) G(u)={y: y>O} for u=l, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
First we demonstrate that x is a medium. From (4. 1) 
G*={y: y>O},. 
( I ) [i(u) - x(u)] EE G* for u = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
because any vector [i(u)-x(u)] has at least one component whose 
value is minus. 
(II) [i(u)-x(u)] + [i(v)-x(v)] EEG*for u, v =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, because any 
vector [i(u) - x(u)] has at least one component whose value is (-1- £), 
and any vector [i(v)-x(v)] has no component whose value is larger 
than (1 + £ )and, by this reason, any vector [i(u) - x(u)] + [i(v) - x(v)] 
has at least one component whose value is not plus. 
(III) [i(u)-x(u)]+[i(v)-x(v)]+[i(w)-x(w)]EEG*, for u, v, w=l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. 
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This is easily inspected. 
(N) !s(i-x) $.G* where ISI~4. 
This case is reduced to the relation that ( (i - x) $. G* where IS'I ~ 2, Js' 
by the relation 
i(u)-x(u)=-[i(v+l)-x(u+l)] for u=l, 3, and 5. 
Thus x is a medium. 
However x is not competitive because, for example, the three vectors 
[i(1) - x(1)], [i(3) - x(3)], and [i(5) - x(5)] 
are linearly independent in R3. We will demonstrate this fact. Suppose 
tha t a [i (1 ) - x (1 ) ] + b [i ( 3 ) - x (3) ] + c [i (5) - x (5)] = 0 
where a, b, and c are real numbers. We will prove that a=b=c=O. 
Then, by considering componentwise, we obtain the following three 
conditions: 
CD a+b+c(l+ .s)=0, 
(2) a(1+ .s)+b(-l- .s)+c(-l- .s)=0, 
® a(-l- .s)+b(1+ .s)+c=O. 
From (2), 
(1) a-b-c=O. 
From ®, and (1), .s(-a+b)=O. Hence 
@ a=b. 
From (1), and @, 
® c=O. 
Hence, from CD, @, and ®, 2a = O. 
Therefore 
(J) a = O. 
Hence, from @, @, and (J), a = b = c = o. 
Therefore, the three vectors are linearly independent in R3. Hence x 
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is not competitive: This proves the exampll Q. E. I). 
The following example is a counter example ()f the assertion that an 
allocation in the core is a medium. 
EXAMPLE(4. 2): Let 
n=2, 
m=4, 
x(k) = (2, 2) for k = 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
i(1) = ( - 0.1, 1) + (2, 2), 
i(2)=-(-0.1, 1)+(2,2) 
i(3)=(1.1, -1.1)+(2, 2), 
i( 4) = - (1.1, -1.1) + (2, 2), 
G(K) = {y: y> O} for k = 1, 3, and 4, and 
G(2) = {y: Yl> 0, >'2> - 0.2, and Yl + 5Y2> O} 
where Y = (Yl, Y2), 
Then G * = G (2), and (i (1) - x (1) ] + ( i (3) - x (3) ] E G * . 
Therefore x is no medium. But it is easily seen that x is in the core. 
This proves the counter example. Q. E. D. 
5. MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS 
In this section, we will deal with markets with a continuum of trad-
ers, and assume without loss of generality that ,u(T) = 1. We will show 
in this section the equivalence of the three propositions as foqows: 
(1) An allocation is competitive, 
(2) An allocation is a medium. 
(3) An allocation is in the core. 
THEOREM(5. 1): If an allocation is competitive, it is a medium. 
PROOF: If x is a competitive allocation, there exists a price vector 
p such that 
(5. 1) p. i(t) ~ p . x(t) for t E T, and 
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(5.2) p ·G(t»O for t E T. 
Let S = {t: p. i(t) > p. x(t), t E T}. Suppose, on the contrary, that ,u (S) 
>0. 
Then j p' i> j p. x. Therefore p . ji > p. j x. However, since ji = j x, 
this is a contradiction. Therefore 
(5. 3) p. x(t) = p. i(t) for all t E T. Hence, for any coalition S, 
(5.4) p. j(i-x)= fsp· (i-x)=O. 
s 
However, from (5. 2), 
(5. 5) p. G* > O. 
From (5. 4), and (5. 5), for any coalition S, G*:tl fs (i - x). Q. E. D. 
LEMMA(5. 1): Let F .be a set valued function. Then j F is convex. 
PROOF: See [1]. Q. E. D. 
LEMMA(5. 2): If x is a medium, there exists a price vector p such 
that p·G*~O, and p·i(t)=p·x(t) for all tET. 
PROOF: Let M =j{O, i-x}. If x is a medium, G* n M = ¢. Since, 
by Lemma (5. 1), G* and M are convex, by separating theorem, there 
exists a price vector p such that p. G* ~ 0, and p. M ~ o. Let S = {t: 
p . i(t) > p . x(t), t E T}. Suppose, on the contrary, that ,u(S) > O. Then 
p. fs (i - x) > O. However, M :') fs (i - x). This is a contradiction. So 
,u(S) = o. 
Let S={t: p. i(t)<p·x(t), tE T}. Suppose, on the contrary, that 
,u(S»O. Then 0> fsp· (i-x)=p· fs(i-x). Since fs(i-x)= - jns(i-
x), p. r (i - x) > O. However M:') r (i - x). This is a contradiction. 
J~ JT~ 
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So .u(S) = 0. Q. E. D. 
LEMMA(5. 3) (Shitovitz): Let ° =t= pER. Then if p . G* ~o, 
(1) p. G(t»O for all t E T, and (2) p ·G*>O. 
PROOF: First we prove (1). Let O=t=pE Rn be such that p ·G*~O. 
By desirability, G(t) contains a translate of Q, and therefore p ~ 0. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that p 1> O. Then we can assume that Pl 
= 0, and P2> 0 without loss of generality where p = (Pl, ... , Pn). By (1. 
l),.u(R»O where R={t: X2(t»0, tET where x(t)=(Xl(t), ... , xn(t))}. 
By desirability, elEG(t) for tET. Let £1> £2> ... -0 be an arbitrary 
sequence of real positive numbers that ~onotonic1ly converges to 0. 
Let Rk = {t:el - £ k • e2 E G(t), t E R}. Then, since, by continuity, G(t)+ 
00 
x(t) is open relative to Q, R = U Rk • Therefore there exists k such 
k=l 
{
el - £ k • e2 for t E R, 
that .u(Rk ) > 0. Let f(t) = ,u(Rk )· £ k • e for t E T\R 
2.u(T\R k ) 2 • 
Then, by desirability, f(t) E G(t) for t E T, and f p . f < 0. This is a 
contradiction. Therefore p> O. 
Assume, on the contrary, that .u(P) > 0 where P = {t: G(t) + x(t) 3 0, 
t E T}, i. e., G(t) 3 -x(t) for tE P. Since x(t)~O, and p>O, -p·x(t)<O 
for tE P. 
If .u(P)=l, G*3 f(-x)=- fx=- fi<O. Therefore p.G*3p·(-fi) 
< 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore.u (P) < 1. Let 
{
-X(t) for t E P. 
g(t) = f 
2 . .u6\p) for t E T\P. 
Since x(t) ~ 0, ~ x ~ 0. Hence, by desirability, g(t) E G(t) for t E T, and 
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f g~O. Hence p. f g<O. Therefore p·G* ~O. This is a contradiction. 
Therefore ,u(P) = 0. Hence G(t) +x(t):t:J ° for all t E T. 
Let 
Q={t: p·G(t) :1>0, t E T}. 
For any fixed t E T, there exists a point a such that a E G(t) and p. 
a~O. Since a+x(t)=t=O, by continuity (i. e. G(t)+x(t) is open relative 
to Q), there exist an integer i and a small number c> ° such that a-
c·ej E G(t). Then p·(a-c·ej)<O. Therefore, by continuity, there ex-
ists a rational point r such that r E G(t), and p·r<O. Let r be any 
rational point such that p·r<O, and Qr={t: rEG(t), tEQ}. Then Q= 
U Qr. Suppose, on the conrary, that ,u(Q»O. Then there exists a r 
r 
such that ,u(Qr»O. 
If ,u(Qr)=l, G* 3 fr=r. Hence p·G* 3p·r<0. This is a contrad-
iction. Therefore ,u(Qr) < 1. Let 
h(t)= ,u(Qr)·p·r I
r for tEQr. 
2,u(T\Qr).lpI2 .p for t E T\Qr. 
By the fact that p>O and desirability, h(t) E G(t) for t E T, and p. f h 
<0. Therefore p·G* *0. This is a contradiction. Hence p·G(t) > 0. 
for all t E T. This proves (1). (2) follows from (1). Q. E. D. 
THEOREM(5. 2): If an allocation is a medium, it is competitive. 
PROOF: This follows from Lemma(5. 2), and Lemma(5. 3). Q. E. D. 
Thus we have proved the eqivalence between a competitive alioca-
tion and a medium. Now we prove the equivalence between a medium 
and an allocation in the core. 
LEMMA(5. 4): Let S be a coalition such that ,u(S) > 0. 
allocation x is blocked by S if and only if Is(i -x) E Is G. 
Then an 
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PROOF: First we prove the "if" part. If fs(i -~) E Is G, there ex-
ists an assignment f such that f(t) E G(t) for all t E S, and 1(i-x)= fsf. 
Hence [i(t)+x(t)]>t x(t) for all tES, and fsi= fs(f+x). Therefore the 
coalition S blocks x. 
Conversely if the coalition S blocks x, there exists an assignment g 
such that g(t»tx(t) for all tES, and fsg= fsi. Therefore [g(t)-x(t)] 
E G(t) for all t E S. Hence fs G 3 fs(g-·x) = fs(i -x). Q. E. D. 
LEMMA(5. 5): Let x be any Pareto optimal allocation. Let SJ, and 
S2 be coalitions such that S1 ~ S2, and ,u(S1) > O. Then r G ~ r G. 
)SI )S2 
PROOF: If ,u(S2\S1) = 0, r G = r G. Therefore the lemma holds. SO 
)SI )S2 
we assume that ,u(Si\S1) * O. Let S = {t: t E S1, G(t) + x(t) = O}. Sup-




o f?r t E s, 
,u(T~T +x(t) for t E T\S. 
Then, by (2. 2) and desirability, f(t) E G(t) +x(t) for all t E T, and ft = 
f x= fi. Hence the coalition T blooks x. So x is not Pareto opti-
mal." This is a contradiction. Therefore G(t) + x(t) ~ 0 for all t E S1. 
Let z be any point such that Z ErG. Then there exists an assign-
)SI 
ment g such that g(t) E G(t) for all t E S, and z = r g. 
)SI 
Let c1, "£2, ... be an arbitrary sequence of positive real numbers such 
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that C1>C2> ... -40. Since g(t)+x(t)=t=O for all tES}, and, bycontinuity 
(i. e., [G(t) +x(t)] is open re~ative to Q), there exist two positive in-
tegers j and N such that g(t) +x(t) - CN°ej E [G(t) + x(t)] for each t E S1. 
Let. 
SNj={t: [g(t)+X(t)-cN·ej E [G(t)+x(t)], tESd. 
Then U l) SNj=Sl. Therefore there exist No and jo such that .u(SNojo) 
N=1 )=1 
Then, by desirability, h(t) E G(t) for all t E S2, and r h = r g =2. 
)S2 )SI 
Therefore r G:2 r G. 
)SI )SI 
THEOREM(5. 3): If an allocation is a medium, it is in the core. 
PROOF: If x is a medium, f(i -x) EE G*. Then, by Lemma(5. 4), T 
does not block x. Therefore x is Pareto optimal. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that x is not in the core. Then there 
exists a coalition S such that .u(S) > 0 and S blocks x. Then, by Lem-
ma(5. 4), 1(i-x) E 1G. Then, by Lemma(5. 5), 1(i-x)E G*. 
Therefore x is no medium. This is a contradicton. Q. E. D. 
THEOREM(5. 4): If an allocation is in the core, it is a medium. 
PROOF: Let an allocation x be in the core. Then x is Pareto opti-
mal. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that x is no medium. Then there exists 
a coalition S such that .u(S) > 0 and 1(i -x) E G*. Then there exists 
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an assignment f such that! f = i(i -x), and f(t) E G(t) for all t E T. 
FIGURE 1 
Define measure m by m(S')=(l,i, i,x, J:,f) for any coalition S'~ T. 
By Lyapunov's theorem, there exist coalitions SI, and S3 such that S1~ 
S, and S3~T\S(see Figure 1), 
~ ((i-x)= r (i-x), ~ ( (i-x)= ((i-x), ~ (f= (f, and ~ ( f= 
2 Js JS1 2 JT\S JS3 2 Js JS1 2 JT~ 
Let S2 = S\S1. Then 21 ((i -x) = ((i -x) = ((i -x). Js JS1 JS2 
( (i-x)= ( (i-x)+ r (i-x) 
J SIU S2US3 J S2 J SIUS3 
=~ ((i-x)+~ji-x) 




=~!f=~ (f+~ ( f 
2 2 Js 2 JT'S 
x. Therefore x is not in the core. This is a contradiction. Q. E. D. 
MEDIA IN MARKETS 95 
6. GAME THEORETIC SOLUTION 
In this section we explain the reason that a medium is a game theo-
retic solution. 
Assume that MI and M2 are the same kind markets, namely we as-
sume as follows. 
Let the sets of all traders of MI and M2 be TI and T2 respectively. 
Then there exists an one-to-one mapping f from MI to M2 such that 
(1) The initial endowments are the same: i(t) =i(f(t)) for t E MI. 
(2) preference relations are the same: if x >tY for t E TI and x, y E Q, 
x> fitlY, 
moreover we assume as folows: 
(3) x(t) = x(f(t) for t E T I. 
Let M be the joined market of MI and M2 • Assume that x is Pareto 
optimal allocation for M. Then if x is no medium in Ml, there exists 
a coalition S~TI such that ((i-x) E (G= (G. Then if S join with 
)s )T\ )T2 
T 2, ((i - x) + ((i - x) = ((i - x) ErG ~ ( G. 
)S )T2 )S\ )T2 )SUT2 
Therefore in the joined market M, the coalition (S U T 2) blocks the 
allocation x. Namely, if there are two same submarkets, an allocation 
must be a medium in each submarket. This is the reason that a me-
dium is a game theoretic solution. 
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